The Catholic Lawyer
Volume 8
Number 1 Volume 8, Winter 1962, Number 1

Article 9

Recent Decisions: Motion Picture Censorship

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl
Part of the Catholic Studies Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Recent Decisions:
Motion Picture Censorship
"No one has the moral or legal right to

exhibit obscene movies."' This seems to be
a fundamental principle, yet much difficulty
has been encountered in attempting to enact
legislation to implement it. In William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana,2 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania indicated to the legislature this difficulty of implementation by
striking down that state's Motion Picture
Control Act of September 17, 1.959 as unconstitutional.
On two prior occasions3 the Pennsylvania
court had similarly condemned statutes
passed to protect the people "against the
flood of cinematic filth always pounding at
'4
the borders of ... [the] Commonwealth."
The Motion Picture Censorship Act of May
15, 1915, as amended by the Act of May
8, 1929, 5 which prohibited the censorship
board from approving such films "as are
sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral,
or such as tend, in the judgment of the
board, to debase or corrupt morals," 6 was
struck down in 1956 as being too vague and
indefinite in its terms so as to offend the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 The same fate befell Section 4528
of the Pennsylvania Penal Code which prohibited "the exhibition of fixed or moving
1 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405

Pa. 83, -, 173 A.2d 59, 70 (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961).
2 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 368 U.S.

897 (1961).
Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417,
153 A.2d 227 (1959); Hallmark Prods., Inc. v.
Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
3

4 William

Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 1 at -, 173 A.2d at 79 (dissenting opinion).
5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 41-58 (1930).
6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 43 (1930).
7 Hallmark Prods., Inc. v. Carroll, supra note 3 at
-, 121 A.2d at 589.

pictures, of a lascivious, sacrilegious, obscene, indecent, or immoral nature and
character, or such as might tend to corrupt
morals. .. ."s The 1959 statute, declared
unconstitutional in the instant case, was enacted as a result of the two prior failures of
the state's attempts at censorship. The
wording of the statute is indicative of the
consideration given to numerous United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with
the problem. 9
The Pennsylvania statute 0 in the instant
case provided for a board of three members,
whose only qualification was that they be
residents of Pennsylvania." The board had
to be notified at least forty-eight hours prior
to any sale, lease, loan, exhibition or use
of any film.12 At any time after the first
showing of a film, the board, for the purpose
of review, could request that it be furnished
a copy of the film."3 The standard adopted
by the *act was: "The board shall have the
power to examine any film ... which shall
have been exhibited at least once ... in order to determine whether such film... is
obscene or unsuitable for children.'1 4 The
terms are clearly defined in the statute in
what appears to be an obvious attempt by
the legislature to escape the "too vague and
indefinite" condemnation imposed upon
prior censorship statutes.' 5 These two cri8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4528 (1945).
9 See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
365 U.S. 43 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 70.1-.14 (Supp. 1960).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.2 (Supp. 1960).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.3 (Supp. 1960).
13 Ibid.
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.5 (Supp. 1960) (emphasis added).
15 Section 70.1, in defining the word "obscenity,"

adopted the definition as set out in the Roth case,

8
teria were the only grounds upon which a
film could be censored. A party receiving an
adverse finding of the board had the right
to demand a re-examination by the board in
his presence and, from this re-examination,
a right to appeal to a court of law. 16
The Court predicated its finding of unconstitutionality on two bases. First, the act
violated the constitutional guarantee of a
jury trial in that it provided for a hearing
before the board members and not before an
impartial jury of the vicinage; second, the
act violated the constitutional prohibition
of prior restraint on communications. Regarding the first, the Court reasoned that the
statute was an expression of the commonlaw crime of uttering an obscene statement. 17 And since a crime was committed
the accused was entitled, not merely to a
board hearing as provided for in the act, but
to a trial by an impartial jury. The Court
predicated this right to jury trial on the
Pennsylvania constitution which states that
"trial by jury shall be as heretofore...
(i.e., it shall exist in all cases in which such
right existed prior to the constitution), and
i.e., if "to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient [interests]," the film is "obscene." Roth v.
United States, supra note 9 at 489. This is the
accepted test of obscenity applied today. This section goes on to define "unsuitable for children" to
mean "a film ..
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which guarantees the accused, in a criminal
prosecution, a trial by jury. 19 The second
basis for the decision was that the act violated the federal and state constitutional
prohibitions of prior restraint on communications, such violations being contrary to
the freedoms of speech and press. 20 The
majority bottomed this conclusion on Joseph

Burstyn, Inc.

v.

Wilson 2 '

which

brought motion pictures into the realm of
the constitutional protections of freedom of
speech and press. Thus, something impinging on these indispensable democratic freedoms is violative of the first and fourteenth
amendments of the federal constitution and
article 1, section 7 of the Pennsylvania constitution. The Court found that section 3 of
the act, requiring forty-eight hours notice
to the board before a film is shown, is an express prior restraint on the initial showing.
[S]ubsequent showings are likewise subjected to previous restraint for the reason
that, if the motion picture is exhibited after

the censors have disapproved it, the exhibitor may be criminally punished upon proof,
not of showing a picture that is obscene or
unsuitable for children, but merely upon
proof of showing a picture the exhibition of
which had been priorly restrained by the
administrative action of the Board oj
22
Censors.

Both of these conclusions of the majority

which is obscene or which incites

to crime." "Incites to crime" is defined as "a film
. ..which represents or portrays as acceptable
conduct or as conduct worthy of emulation the
commission of any crime, or the manifesting of
contempt for law." It appears that the legislative
standard incorporated in this act is far from being
"too vague and indefinite."
6
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.9 (Supp. 1960).
17 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405
Pa. 83, -, 173 A.2d 59, 64, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
897 (1961); see Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa.
412 (1852), wherein defendant was convicted of
uttering obscene matters.
ISPA. CONST. art. I, § 6.

1." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
20 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra

note 17 at -, 173 A.2d at 61-64; see U.S. CONST.
amend. I; PA. CONST. art I, § 7.
Prior restraint is adequately defined as "administrative controls prior to any publication, such as
licensing or other devices according to which no
publication whatever may take place without
prior approval of a public official." William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra note 17 at -,
173 A.2d at 69 (dissenting opinion).
21343 U.S. 495 (1952).
22 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 17 at -, 173 A.2d at 64.
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opinion were attacked in two dissenting
opinions. They interpreted the act as simply
establishing a system of administrative control, rather than creating a penal sanction.
The act, according to the dissents, is analogous to the Pennsylvania Liquor Code and
other administrative provisions which allow
a commissioner or a board to make findings
and levy penalties for violations of statutes
in issue and which make no provision for a
trial by jury. 23 On the issue of prior restraint,
the dissents pointed out that it was recognized in Near v. Minnesota24 that freedom
of speech and press are not absolute rights
and may be subject to prior restraint in
certain limited areas. While thus finding that
prior restraint per se is not a violation of
either the federal or state constitution, the
dissents stressed that the act does not, in
fact, impose a prior restraint. It was their
contention that the requirement of an initial
showing before the board can view the film
25
renders the issue of prior restraint moot.

offenses and prescribe the mode of ascertaining the guilt of those violating them
without providing for a jury trial.28 The
existence of administrative tribunals is
predicated upon this legislative prerogative. And since the guarantee of trial by
jury extends only to criminal proceedings
and to those common-law offenses existing
prior to the constitution,2 9 the right to trial
by jury is not violated in an administrative
hearing. The act was apparently not intended to be a penal law, but merely
administrative legislation passed to fulfill
an immediate need of the people of Pennsylvania. The purpose of such an act is to
secure decency and morality in the motion
picture industry, a purpose which falls
within the police power of the state. 0 The
welfare of the state demands that every
effort be made to sustain such legislation.
The majority opinion, for reasons not
apparent, overlooked the legislature's obvi-

The validity of administrative tribunals
has long been recognized. The appointment
of a board, commission or commissioner to
determine both questions of law and fact
is an essential part of our administrative
procedure. 26 The Pennsylvania Motion Picture Control Act simply created an administrative board. In so doing, the legislature
did not violate any constitutional guarantees. 27 The legislature may create new

was held valid under the seventh amendment because the proceeding was "not in the nature of a
suit at common law." Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. City
of Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 537 (1899).
28 Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corp. v. Breitinger, 250 Pa. 225, -, 95 Atil. 433, 438 (1915).
See Commonwealth ex rel. McClain v. Locke, 72
Pa. 491 (1873) wherein Judge Agnew comments:
"What is more common than to appoint commissioners under a law to determine things upon the

23

Id. at -,

see

173 A.2d at 76 (dissenting opinion);

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 47, §§ 1-101 to 9-902

(1951). See especially § 7-741 which prescribes
the duty of the board.
24 283 U.S. 691, 716 (1931).
25 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, supra
note 17 at -, 173 A.2d at 71-76 (dissenting
opinion).
26 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 1.01 (2d ed.
1959).
27 A statute authorizing an administrative tribunal
to hear claims against a municipal corporation

decision of which the act is to operate in one
way or another?... [T]ake the case of granting
a license to keep an inn and sell liquor. The judge
determines whether the license is necessary, and
if not necessary, the law says to the applicant,
'No license.' The law takes effect just as the judge
determines, yet who says it is the court that legislates? ... [T]he true distinction, I conceive, is
this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power
to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend." Id. at 498.
29 PA. CONSi". art. 1, §§ 6, 9.
30 Block v. City of Chicago, 239 Il. 251, -, 87
N.E. 1011, 1013 (1909).

8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER

ous attempt at escaping condemnation of
the act on grounds of prior restraint. The
opinion failed to recognize how section
70.7, providing for one showing before the
board could censor a film, avoided the constitutional bar of prior restraint. The Court,
citing Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago3' and Near v. Minnesota,3 2 conceded
that not all prior restraint is unconstitutional and recognized the need for certain
exceptions. While the issue of prior restraint formed the basis of the majority
opinion, the dissents recognized that the act
31365 U.S. 43 (1961).
32 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

Textbooks for Parochial Schools
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the
recent case of Dickman v. School Dist. No.
62C,1 was called upon to decide the constitutionality of a statute which stated that:
[E]ach district school board shall .. .provide textbooks, prescribed or authorized by
law, for the free and equal use of all pupils
residing in its district and enrolled in and
actually attending standard elementary
schools ....2
In accord with this statute public funds
were expended to provide textbooks, for
students in both public and parochial
schools. A taxpayer sought to enjoin a
school board "from supplying textbooks
without charge for the use of pupils enrolled in ...a parochial school ....,,3
The
Court held that this expenditure was for'-Ore.
2

-, 366 P.2d 532 (1961).
ORE.REV. STAT. § 337.150(1)

3Dickman

(1957).

v. School Dist. No. 62C, - Ore.-,
336 P.2d 533, 534-35 (1961).
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made such a discussion an unrelated issue.
The legislature was aware of this problem,
and had attempted to escape involvement
by providing for an initial showing prior to
a board determination.
The difficulties involved in enacting censorship statutes are very apparent in the
instant case. The Pennsylvania legislature
took precautions to avoid the constitutional
pitfalls to which similar legislation had
fallen victim- yet the act was stricken
down. An inescapable question has thus
been created: What guides can a legislature
utilize when drafting censorship statutes so
as to be reasonably certain that the courts
will sustain them?

bidden by the Oregon constitution, which
provides: "No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury for the benefit of any religeous
[sic], or theological institution. .... -4
The Dickman decision illustrates the
conflict which often arises when legislation
aimed at benefiting education indirectly
confers a benefit upon sectarian institutions. In the past, courts have upheld such
legislation by relying on either the "remuneration" or the "child benefit" theory.
According to the "remuneration" 5 the4 ORE. CONST. art. I,

§ 5.
5 St. Hedwig's Industrial School for Girls v. Cook
County, 289 111. 432, -, 124 N.E. 629, 631 (1919);
Murrow Indian Orphans Home v. Childers, 197
Okla. 249,-, 171 P.2d 600, 601-03 (1946); State
ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251,-, 176
N.W. 224, 228 (1920). The Murrow case distinguished the cases based on a remuneration theory
from those involving the use of public money to
provide transportation for pupils to parochial
schools on the ground that in the latter cases
the state received no value for its money. But see
Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d

1002 (1941).

